The security notion of indifferentiability was proposed by Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein in 2004. In 2005, Coron, Dodis, Malinaud, and Puniya discussed the indifferentiability of hash functions. They showed that the Merkle-Damgård construction is not secure in the sense of indifferentiability. In this paper, we analyze the security of single-block-length and rate-1 compression functions in the sense of indifferentiability. We formally show that all single-block-length and rate-1 compression functions, which include the Davies-Meyer compression function, are insecure. Furthermore, we show how to construct a secure single-block-length and rate-1 compression function in the sense of indifferentiability. This does not contradict our result above.
Introduction
Most of the hash functions are designed as iterative processes which hash an arbitrary-length message by processing successive fixed-size blocks of the message. A function for processing the fixed-size blocks is called a compression function. The Merkle-Damgård construction is widely used to construct a hash function by the iteration of the compression function [4] [10] . To improve the security, other constructions have been proposed recently (e.g., [3] [7] [14] ).
In all constructions, the security of the underlying compression function is closely related with that of the constructed hash function. Compression functions are usually designed using secure block ciphers. For example, the Davies-Meyer compression function, the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas compression function, and the Miyaguchi-Preneel compression function, which are the most popular compression functions, are based on block ciphers [9] . Compression functions can be classified as the hash length and the number of calls. Let n be the ciphertext length of the underlying block cipher, and let and m be the output length and the message length of the compression function, respectively.
Hash length: If /n = 1, then the compression function is called a single-block-length compression function. If /n = 2, then it is called a double-block-length compression function.
Number of calls: Let σ be the number of calling the underlying block cipher to produce one output of the compression function. A rate r of the compression function is defined as r = m/(nσ), which represents the efficiency of the compression function. A compression function with a rate of r is called a rate-r compression function.
The security of compression functions has been discussed in the sense of preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance. In particular, the security of collision resistance is theoretically and practically important. From the theoretical viewpoint, the complexity of collision resistance is not larger than O(2 /2 ) where is the output length. This fact is often called the birthday bound. From the practical viewpoint, drawbacks of actual hash functions have been firstly found in terms of collision resistance [5] [15] [16] . In addition to the three security notions above, the notion of indifferentiability has been introduced to the security of hash functions and compression functions recently [3] [6] . The notion of indifferentiability is stronger than that of collision resistance. To design more secure hash functions or more secure compression functions, it is necessary to discuss the security in the sense of indifferentiability.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to single-block-length and rate-1 compression functions (SBL-1 compression functions). The class of SBL-1 compression functions is practically important. For example, the popular compression functions above are included in this class. When the ciphertext length of the underlying block cipher is equal to its key length, the efficiency of SBL-1 compression functions is optimal because, by definitions, the rate of any single-block-length compression function is not larger than 1.
The security of SBL-1 compression functions has been studied in detail. Preneel, Govaerts, and Vandewalle [13] have discussed the security against several attacks, and concluded that 12 compression functions are secure against the attacks. We note that 64 possible SBL-1 compression functions exist. Black, Rogaway, and Shrimpton [2] have investigated the provable security of the 64 possible SBL-1 compression functions. They concluded that the 12 compression functions of Preneel et al. is optimally collision resistant. 1 Black, Cochran, and Shrimpton [1] have shown that no rate-1 compression function can produce a provable collision-resistant hash function if the key space is a small fixed set. Their result is practically significant because the practical hash speed would be improved by the precomputation of the key schedule algorithm of the block cipher if the key space were small. Accordingly, SBL-1 compression functions must be designed in such a way that the key space is fully used.
The notion of indifferentiability has been introduced by Maurer, Renner, and Holenstein [8] to discuss the extended indistinguishability of systems. Coron, Dodis, Malinaud, and Puniya [3] have applied the notion of indifferentiability to the construction of hash functions from underlying compression functions. They showed that the Merkle-Damgård construction is insecure in the sense of indifferentiability, and they also proposed some methods for enhancing the security of the MerkleDamgård construction. In this paper, we discuss the security of SBL-1 compression functions in terms of indifferentiability, not hash functions. Indeed, Coron et al. [3] briefly discussed the indifferentiability only of the Davies-Meyer compression function. Hirose [6] discussed the indifferentiability of double-block-length compression functions with the special-form input. This paper formally discusses the indifferentiability of the 12 SBL-1 compression functions, which are secure in the sense of collision resistance [2] [13] . Furthermore, this paper proposes a new SBL-1 compression function that is secure in the sense of indifferentiability.
The organization and the contribution of this paper are as follows. In Sect. 2, we describe notations and definitions about indifferentiability. The definition of indifferentiability is the same as that of previous papers [3] [8], but we introduce an experiment to evaluate the advantage of a distinguisher.
In Sect. 3, we discuss the indifferentiability of the Davies-Meyer compression function. When the distinguisher can have access only to the encryption oracle, the Davies-Meyer compression function is not so insecure. However, when the distinguisher can have access to the encryption oracle and the decryption oracle, the Davies-Meyer compression function is insecure. This drawback was briefly pointed out by Coron et al. [3] , but they did not analyze the security formally. We give the formal analysis of the Davies-Meyer compression function in terms of indifferentiability.
In Sect. 4, we show that the negative result of the Davies-Meyer compression function is applicable to other SBL-1 compression functions. As a result, all the 64 SBL-1 compression functions have the security drawback in terms of preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, collision resistance, or indifferentiability.
In Sect. 5, we propose a new SBL-1 compression function, which is called a block-cipher-selection compression function (a BCS compression function). The feature of the BCS compression function is that one block cipher is selectively used among many block ciphers to produce an output for a given input. We prove that the BCS compression function is secure in the sense of indifferentiability. We explain why this result does not contradict the result of Sect. 4. In Sect. 6, we summarize results of this paper and problems in the future.
Notations and Definitions
We will write a ← b to mean that a is to be set to the result of evaluating expression b, and write a $ ← A to mean that a is uniformly chosen at random from a finite set A. Let κ, n be positive integers. A block cipher is a function e: {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n where, for each w ∈ {0, 1} κ , e(w, ·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n . For the block cipher e, the inverse (the decryption function) is denoted by d, i.e., d(w, z) is the string x such that z = e(w, x). Let E κ,n be the set of all block ciphers e: {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . A block cipherê is said to be an ideal block cipher ifê is uniformly selected at random from E κ,n , i.e., ifê $ ← E κ,n . Let H m,n be the set of all functions from {0, 1} m to {0, 1} n . A functionĤ is said to be a random function ifĤ is randomly selected from H m,n , i.e., if
In this paper, we discuss the construction of a single-block-length and rate-1 compression function H based on the block cipher e ∈ E n,n . That is, H is a function in H 2n,n and requires one invocation of e to produce an output for a given input. Our goal is to construct the compression function H that is indistinguishable from the random functionĤ ∈ H 2n,n . In previous works, the security of the compression function based on the block cipher has been studied in terms of preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance. Since the random functionĤ naturally satisfies these security requirements with desirable level, our goal is reasonable. Our idea is similar to that of Coron et al. [3] They considered that the random function was ideal of the hash function. Accordingly, they studied how to construct a hash function {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n that is indistinguishable from a random function {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n .
To measure the indifferentiability between two functions, the following definition has been introduced in [3] [8] (Fig. 1) .
Definition 1 A function Hf with oracle access to an ideal primitivef is said to be (t D , t f , q, ) indifferentiable from an ideal primitiveĤ if there exists a simulator fĤ such that the following equation holds for any distinguisher D.
Pr 
The distinguisher has access to not only Hf but alsof (similarly, not onlyĤ but also fĤ ). The simulator fĤ has oracle access toĤ and runs in time at most t f . The distinguisher runs in time at most t D and makes at most q queries. If is a negligible function of the security parameter k, then
Hf is said to be indifferentiable fromĤ.
When we focus on the probability , we consider the following experiment to evaluate it. step 1: Choose a bit ξ ∈ {0, 1} at random, then determine (H, f ) as follows:
The distinguisher does not know the value of ξ. step 2: After the distinguisher had access to (H, f ), the distinguisher guesses the value of ξ, denoted by ξ D .
Using the above experiment, we define the advantage of the distinguisher D with at mostueries as follows: 
In this paper, we denote by a symbol without 'ˆ' an actual algorithm, and denote by a symbol with 'ˆ' an ideal function. In addition, we denote by a symbol with ' ' either the actual algorithm or the ideal function. For example, when we argue a block cipher, g is an actual block cipher,ĝ is an ideal block cipher, and g is either the actual block cipher g or the ideal block cipherĝ.
Davies-Meyer Compression Function
There are 12 compression functions that are secure in the sense of collision resistance [2] . The DaviesMeyer compression function, which is widely used in actual hash algorithms such as SHA-2 [12] , is one of the 12 compression functions. In this section we discuss the indifferentiability of the Davies-Meyer compression function (Fig. 2) . The Davies-Meyer compression function H is defined as
whereê(w, x) is the ideal block cipher in E n,n .
Only Encryption Oracle
We discuss the indifferentiability between the Davies-Meyer compression function and the random function when the distinguisher is allowed to have access to only e. One must construct a simulator eĤ such that interacting (Hê,ê) is indistinguishable from interacting (Ĥ, eĤ ). We assume that the distinguisher does not make the same query. Our simulator eĤ is defined as follows: step 1: Initially, i ← 0 and eĤ (w, x) is undefined for any (w, x) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n . step 2: eĤ receives a query (w, x) from the distinguisher.
The above simulator eĤ may fail to emulate the ideal block cipherê. Specifically, if eĤ
. . , i − 1}, then eĤ fails to emulateê because eĤ w i is no longer a permutation on {0, 1} n . Let C i be the event that there exists such an ι ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i − 1} at the i-the query and there does not exist such an ι at previous queries. As long as C i does not occur, eĤ can perfectly emulateê. Since the probability Pr [C i ] is not larger than (i − 1)/2 n , the probability Pr [fail] that eĤ fails to emulateê is given as follows:
Since the following equation holds for any distinguisher D,
we have
By demonstrating a distinguisher that achieves advantage close to the above upper bound, we show that the bound is tight. Our distinguisher D is defined as follows: 
We note that if H = Hê, i.e., ξ = 0, then there is no such a pair. We evaluate the probability Pr [col] that there is such a pair as follows:
Using the fact that exp(−x) gives a close approximation to 1 − x when x is close to 0, we observe that the lower bound of Eq. (3) is approximately equal to the upper bound of Eq. (2) if q is sufficiently smaller than 2 n . We notice that the above distinguisher does not have access to e. The availability of e is not effective for this distinguisher.
Encryption and Decryption Oracles
We discuss the indifferentiability between the Davies-Meyer compression function and the random function when the distinguisher is allowed to have access to both of the encryption oracle e and the decryption oracle d. Although one should construct a simulator (eĤ , dĤ ) such that interacting (Hê, (ê,d)) is indistinguishable from interacting (Ĥ, (eĤ , dĤ )), it is impossible to construct such a simulator. This drawback was briefly pointed out by Coron at el. [3] , but they did not discuss the differentiability quantitatively.
In this section, we analyze the differentiability by demonstrating a distinguisher. Let us consider the distinguisher D defined below. If H = Hê, i.e., ξ = 0, then it holds that x j = y j for ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q} from Eq. (1). If H =Ĥ, i.e., ξ = 1, then there may exist ι such that x ι = y ι for ∃ι ∈ {1, 2, . . . , q}. When H =Ĥ, the probability Pr [neq] that there exists such an ι is given by we obtain the advantage of the distinguisher D as follows:
In the above discussion, we did not say anything about the algorithm of the simulator dĤ . Because, even if dĤ is intelligently constructed, the advantage cannot be decreased. To decrease the advantage, dĤ must find x such that x =Ĥ(w, x) for a given w. SinceĤ is the random function, the probability that there exists such an x is given by
Conversely, there does not exist such an x with a probability of approximately 36/100. Since this probability is based only on the randomness ofĤ, dĤ cannot change it even if dĤ has the unlimited computational resources. In the case that there is no such an x, whatever dĤ may return as x j , the distinguisher can obtain (x j , y j ) such that x j = y j .
Other Collision-Resistant Compression Functions
In Sect. 3, we discussed the (in)differentiability of the Davies-Meyer compression function. In this section, we discuss the indifferentiability of other 11 SBL-1 compression functions that are secure in the sense of collision resistance [2] . As described below, we will find that the 11 compression functions are not better than the Davies-Meyer compression function in terms of the indifferentiability. We classify the 12 SBL-1 compression functions including the Davies-Meyer compression function as the feedforward. Denoting byê the ideal block cipher in E n,n , we have the following six sets.
For example, the type-1 set includes the Davies-Meyer compression function and the Matyas-MeyerOseas compression function. In the case of the Davies-Meyer compression function, w is a message block and x is an output of the previous compression function. In the case of the Matyas-Meyer-Oseas compression function, w is an output of the previous compression function and x is a message block. The type-2 set includes the Miyaguchi-Preneel compression function, which takes w as an output of the previous compression function and x as a message block.
The discussion in Sect. 3 does not depend on the use of parameters, i.e., which a parameter is a message block. Hence, all type-1 functions have the same security as the Davies-Meyer compression function in the sense of indifferentiability.
Only Encryption Oracle
Suppose that the distinguisher is allowed to have access to only e. We consider the construction of a simulator eĤ i where i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 6} that is similar to the simulator of Sect. 3.1. For a given query (ω, χ) to eĤ i , the query (w, x) toĤ i is uniquely determined. Like the simulator of Sect. 3.1, the output z i is computed fromĤ i (w, x) and (ω, χ). Although the computation of z i depends onĤ i , it can be done by the bitwise exclusive OR. When eĤ i (ω, ·) is no longer the permutation for ∃ω, eĤ i (ω, ·) fails to emulateê(ω, ·). Hence, the advantage of the distinguisher is given by Eq. (2).
Encryption and Decryption Oracles
Suppose that the distinguisher is allowed to have access to e and d. We consider a distinguisher that is a similar to that of Sect. 3.2. Namely, the distinguisher first asks (ω, 0) to d, and then asks the query (w, x), which is based on the response of d, to H i . When the output ofê is 0, the output of Hê i is computed by a bitwise function of (w, x). On the other hand, the output ofĤ is not probably given by the bitwise function of (w, x). Therefore, there exists the distinguisher that can achieve the advantage of Eq. (4).
Block-Cipher-Selection Compression Function
From results of [2] [13] and results of previous sections, we conclude that all the 64 SBL-1 compression functions have the security drawback in terms of preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, collision resistance, or indifferentiability. However, we propose a new SBL-1 compression function that is secure in the sense of indifferentiability.
Construction
Let u = 2 n − 1. Letê i (i = 0, 1, . . . , u) be ideal block ciphers in E n,n where eachê i is selected independently of each other, i.e.,ê i $ ← E n,n for ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , u}. We define a compression function Hê 0 ,ê 1 ,...,eu as follows:
where x ∈ {0, 1} n is considered as the binary representation of an integer in {0, 1, . . . , u}. For simplification, we denote by {ê} u the set ofê 0 ,ê 1 , . . . , andê u . Using this notation, we rewrite Eq. (5) as
Since H {ê}u is a function in H 2n,n and requires one invocation ofê i to produce an output for a given input, H {ê}u is an SBL-1 compression function. We call this compression function a block-cipherselection compression function (a BCS compression function).
Security Analysis
We now discuss the indifferentiability between the BCS compression function H {ê}u and the random functionĤ. As described below, unlike the 64 SBL-1 compression functions, the BCS compression function is completely indifferentiable from the random function. That is, even if the distinguisher has infinitely computational resources, the probability that the distinguisher can distinguish the BCS compression function from the random function is equal to 0. Hence, the BCS compression is optimal in the sense of indifferentiability. This fact is due to two properties of the BCS compression function.
• For a fixed i,ê i (·, i) is the random function in H n,n , not a permutation on {0, 1} n .
• For a fixed i, almost all mappingsê i (w, x) are not used for the computation of Hê i , i.e., only mappingsê i (w, i) are used.
We assume that the distinguisher does not make the same query. Let (e, i, w, x) be a query to e i for requiring the computation of e i (w, x) where e is a special symbol to denote a used oracle. Similarly, let (d, i, w, y) be a query to d i for requiring d i (w, y). 
Only Encryption Oracle
Suppose that only {e} u is available to the distinguisher. We discuss the indifferentiability between H {ê}u andĤ. 
1). The space complexity of the simulator is O(q).
One must construct a simulator {eĤ } u such that interacting (H {ê}u , {ê} u ) is indifferentiable from interacting (Ĥ, {eĤ } u ). Our simulator {eĤ } u is defined as follows. Our simulator has plaintextciphertext tables of eĤ i (w, ·) for ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , u} and ∀w ∈ {0, 1} n as shown in Fig. 3 . Each table is denoted by e i (w). Let X i,w be the set of plaintexts x in e i (w), and let Y i,w be the set of ciphertexts y in e i (w). step 1: Initially, j i,w ← 0 for ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , u} and ∀w ∈ {0, 1} n . All tables are initialized with a special symbol blank, which means that the entry is not yet used.
step 2: The simulator receives a query (e, i, w, x) from the distinguisher. j i,w ← j i,w +1 and
After v ←Ĥ(w, i), the simulator determines y j i,w as follows:
The simulator replaces (blank, blank) in the table e i (w) with (x j i,w , y j i,w ), and returns y j i,w .
Unlike the simulator of Sect. 3.1, {eĤ } u can perfectly emulate {ê} u . In step 2, the simulator updates the table e i (w), keeping a one-to-one and random mapping. When x takes a string in {0, 1} n for a fixed i and a fixed w, the distribution of eĤ i (w, x) is identical to that ofê i (w, x). Hence, we have Adv H (q) = 0, which is better than that of the Davies-Meyer compression function. The time complexity of the simulator depends on the number of queries toĤ. KeepingĤ(w, i), the simulator makes at most min(q, 2 2n ) queries toĤ. The size of tables is O(q). The distinguisher can make at most 2 3n queries to {e} u and at most 2 2n queries to H. Hence, the number q of queries is not larger than 2 2n (2 n + 1).
Encryption and Decryption Oracles
Suppose that both of {e} u and {d} u are available to the distinguisher. We now discuss the indifferentiability between H {ê}u andĤ. One must construct a simulator ({eĤ } u , {dĤ } u ) such that interacting (H {ê}u , ({ê} u , {d} u )) is indifferentiable from interacting (Ĥ, ({eĤ } u , {dĤ } u )). Our simulator ({eĤ } u , {dĤ } u ) is defined as follows. Our simulator has plaintext-ciphertext tables of eĤ i (w, ·) for ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , u} and ∀w ∈ {0, 1} n , as well as the simulator of Sect. 5.2.1 (Fig. 3) . Suppose that the table e i (w) is shared by eĤ i and dĤ i . step 1: Initially, j i,w ← 0 for ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , u} and ∀w ∈ {0, 1} n . All tables are initialized with blank.
step 2: When the simulator received a query (e, i, w, x), the simulator checks whether x ∈ X i,w or not. 
The simulator replaces (blank, blank) in the table e i (w) with (x j i,w , y j i,w ), and returns y j i,w . 
The simulator replaces (blank, blank) in the table e i (w) with (x j i,w , y j i,w ), and returns x j i,w .
This simulator can perfectly emulate ({ê} u , {d} u ). For ∀e i (w), x ∈ X i,w corresponds to unique y ∈ Y i,w , i.e., there is no
2) is randomly selected from {0, 1} n avoiding the collision. This behavior is identical to that of the ideal block cipherê i (w, ·). Hence, we have Adv H (q) = 0, which is substantially better than that of the Davies-Meyer compression function. The time complexity of the simulator depends on the number of queries toĤ. KeepingĤ(w, i), the simulator makes at most min(q, 2 2n ) queries toĤ. The size of tables is O(q). The distinguisher can make at most 2 3n+1 queries to ({e} u , {d} u ) and at most 2 2n queries to H. Hence, the number q of queries is not larger than 2 2n (2 n+1 + 1).
Implementation
When the compression function based on the block cipher is implemented, the ideal block cipher is probably replaced with an actual block cipher such as AES [11] . Since usual SBL-1 compression functions require only one block cipher, its implementation is easy. In contrast, it seems impractical to implement the BCS compression function because it requires 2 n actual block ciphers. . Since a long-length key is usually available to actual block ciphers, this way is applicable to many actual block ciphers. We notice that the discussion is separately needed to make a formal determination whether the set of block ciphers obtained by this way can be considered as the set of ideal block ciphers.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have shown that the 12 single-block-length and rate-1 (SBL-1) compression functions, which are secure in the sense of collision resistance, are not secure in the sense of indifferentiability. Notice that the Davies-Meyer compression function is one of the 12 SBL-1 compression functions. From results of [2] [13] and those of this paper, we concluded that all the 64 SBL-1 compression functions have the security drawback in terms of preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, collision resistance, or indifferentiability.
We have proposed the block-cipher-selection (BCS) compression function, which is secure in terms of indifferentiability. Although the BCS compression function is formally the SBL-1 compression function, the negative result above is inapplicable to the BCS compression function. Unlike the 64 SBL-1 compression functions, the BCS compression function selectively uses one block cipher among many block ciphers. We have proved that if the simulator has reasonable computational resources, then the BCS compression function can perfectly emulate the random function, that is, the BCS compression function is optimal in the sense of indifferentiability. We have also proposed the implementation of the BCS compression function using actual block ciphers. However, the security of the implementation must be analyzed in future.
